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Abstract—Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are a novel
communication scenario. They allow vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications. New services
are envisioned through these networks affecting road traffic
safety. Current proposals are based on sharing each vehicle´s
perceptions about their own environment. Nevertheless, it is also
possible for a vehicle to know the status of their neighbours in a
given moment. Thus, a vehicle can obtain from their neighbours
their perceptions about its status. Neighbours then become
witnesses. Sometimes it is necessary to prove a vehicle´s behavior
in a given moment (e.g. accident dispute, speeding fines, etc.).
As own sensors can be tampered with, having testimonies from
witnesses can contribute to have a reliable source of information.
In this work we present EVIGEN, a protocol to obtain such
testimonies and generate digital evidences. A security analysis is
performed to verify the accomplishment of evidence generation
requirements.
Index Terms—EVIGEN, digital evidence, VANET, witness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, road transport is an essential activity in human
daily routine. Because of that, increasing investments are
being made, leading to remarkable improvements on this area.
On one hand, traffic casualties are lowering each year and
countries like Sweden have put the goal of zero road traffic
fatalities and serious injuries by 2020 [1]. On the other hand,
infotainment is also demanded by passengers to improve their
comfort. Thus, it is necessary to have content distribution
(DAB/DVB) and also mail and IM access, among others
Information technologies are being strongly improved
to deal with such new needs in vehicular environments.
Apart from traditional communication technologies (Wi-Fi,
GSM/GPRS, etc.), Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs)
are being developed as a new means of communication. These
networks enable not only Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I, I2V)
communications, but also Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) intercon-
nection.
VANETs enable new applications for a better traffic man-
agement. It is now possible for vehicles to announce some
road hazard, an accident or even a traffic jam. Moreover,
special vehicles (firemen patrols, ambulances, police patrols)
can announce their presence, making easier for themselves to
have a free way. These applications are mainly based on sen-
sors currently incorporated into vehicles. Vehicles now share
their own vision of their environment based on their sensor
measurements. In this way, drivers can have an enhanced
vision of the current status of the road.
The current state-of-the-art technologies enable a new fam-
ily of applications through VANETs. In particular, there are
situations in which it is necessary for a vehicle to proof its
recent behavior. For example, when an accident happens, it
is useful to have an accurate description of the situation for
liability purposes. As this description would be employed in
courts, a digital evidence containing such data must be built.
Although it is often assumed that vehicles will be equipped
with reliable components (e.g. TPMs, EDRs), sensors (or
the underlying automotive bus systems) can be tampered
with. Although countermeasures have been proposed, they are
not present on all current buses [2]. For this reason, own
sensor measurements should not be employed for building
such evidences, or at least it should be advisable to have an
alternative approach.
A more reliable data source about a vehicle´s behavior
is needed. VANETs can be useful for this purpose. Indeed,
vehicles driving around one another could act as its witnesses.
Previous contributions have shown the chance of a vehicle to
relate some of its sensor measurements with the originating
vehicle [3]. These data can be now shared by using inter-
vehicle communications in VANETs. Taking these external
data into account, creating a false description of the situation
will be harder, as the attacker should control the majority of
witnesses.
In this work we propose EVIGEN (EVIdence GENeration)
protocol for obtaining such data about one´s behavior from
nearby vehicles. The protocol also involves the creation of
a digital evidence, that is, a digital document to attest the
collected data. This evidence will be useful for supporting
a hypothesis when contradictory versions are offered in a
dispute resolution. Concretely, the following applications are
envisioned to be addressed by EVIGEN:
1) Spatial-temporal attestation. To show that a vehicle was
in some place at a given moment.
2) Adequate behavior. A vehicle´s speed was under the
maximum limit whenever a speeding fine was issued.
3) Accident reconstruction. To have a record of the last
actions performed by a vehicle when an accident hap-
pened.
An interesting feature of EVIGEN is that it allows building
a unified evidence, taking into account the received data. This
will be preferred in courts, where proofs are expected to be as
specific as possible while being useful for the process. For this
purpose, each witness will send an authorization token along
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with their estimations. It will allow the requester to reflect
each witness´ endorsement to the unified value.
For assuring the security properties of the data at stake,
the protocol makes use of the security tools proposed by the
current standard on this area (IEEE 1609.2 [4]). To evaluate
the security of the proposal an analysis is performed, including
privacy issues.
Paper outline. On Section II the term evidence is clarified
and the requirements for obtaining such evidences are pre-
sented. The underlying model of EVIGEN is introduced in
Section III. The proposed protocol is presented in Section IV,
while in Section V the corresponding verification process is
described. The security analysis of the proposal is performed
on Section VI. Some practical issues related to EVIGEN will
be presented on Section VII. The related work is presented on
VIII and Section IX shows the lessons learned from this work
and future research lines.
II. DIGITAL EVIDENCES. CREATION IN VEHICULAR
ENVIRONMENTS
In this Section we present a definition of digital evidence.
Once its main features have been introduced, we will elaborate
on which tools can be useful to get such evidences on a
vehicular environment.
A. Evidences and digital evidences. Definition and require-
ments
The term evidence has been widely addressed so far. Ini-
tially, evidence may be defined as “any material which would
aid the court in establishing the probability of past events into
which it must inquire” [5]. This definition is very general and
does not reflect the own nature of computer-based evidence.
For this purpose, the International Organization on Computer
Evidence (IOCE) defined digital evidence as “the information
stored or transmitted in binary form that may be relied upon
in court” [6].
Taking into account these definitions, we speak about digital
evidences when the conclusions that can be derived from it
are indisputable. Nevertheless, although digital evidences are
expected to be probative, in many legal systems it is the
judge who has to consider their relevance within a process.
This decision is mainly based on the general principles of
admissibility, which are not the same in all countries. However,
the admissibility is generally linked to some basic require-
ments [7]:
● Authenticity and reliability. The proof must be unaltered
and must contain reliable data.
● Completeness. The proof must contain as much data as
possible to describe the fact.
● Law compliance. It is especially relevant that the proof
has not been obtained by violating other rights.
B. Tools for building digital evidences in vehicular environ-
ments
The creation of digital evidences requires an extremely strict
and secure process. This is not easily reachable in vehicular
environments, where events happen in an unpredictable man-
ner and there is not a global infrastructure to register them.
Reliable data acquisition and recording are current problems
in this scenario. Nevertheless, some other inherent features of
vehicles can be helpful for this purpose. In the following we
will show how VANETs and reliable hardware modules can
help creating digital evidences.
The completeness principle previously introduced makes
essential to collect all the potential information for creating
the evidence. Recalling the target applications cited on Section
I, the following list illustrates the main pieces of information
for each specific use:
● Spatial-temporal attestation: Position, time, identity.
● Correct behavior: Position, time, identity, attribute (e.g.
speed).
● Accident reconstruction: Position, time, identity, descrip-
tion of the situation (including: lane, preceding vehicles´
attributes, etc.)
Different sources are commonly employed to obtain these
data. Positioning systems (e.g. GPS) or sensors attached to
the vehicle (e.g. rain sensors, tyre pressure, etc.) are only two
examples. However, these sources could be tampered with.
Positioning systems could be attacked in practice (e.g. jam-
ming attacks [8]). On the other hand, current automotive bus
networks are not strongly protected and could be maliciously
altered. Some countermeasures have been proposed, but they
have not been incorporated into all automotive systems so
far [2]. Moreover, unexpected sensor errors can take place at
any time.
Data contained within digital evidences must be reliable.
However, sensor information does not assure such quality.
Moreover, in our context, digital evidences will be built by
a vehicle to get some benefit (e.g. avoiding a speeding fine).
Thus, there is a motivation for altering such sensor information
- to build a false description of the real situation to achieve
such reward. It would be advisable to have independent
sources for these data. Such information redundancy would
improve the global data quality, as malicious or faulty infor-
mation could be detected and discarded. This redundancy can
be achieved by using VANETs. As vehicles will be equipped
with a sensor set, vehicles surrounding a given one can become
such information sources for it. These vehicles will be referred
as witnesses in the remainder.
Using witnesses enable us to have a more complete and
reliable data for building evidences. However, the authenticity
requirement for evidence admissibility goes beyond the data
quality. Some security guarantees must be provided to protect
the whole process of building that evidence. As sensor data
will be sent among vehicles, integrity must be provided to
assure that no alterations have been made. On the other hand,
non-repudiation and origin authentication are necessary for the
evidence holder. In this way, it will not be able to deny having
built such evidence related to itself. Moreover, confidentiality
and privacy must be assured for all participants, as sensitive
information could be interchanged. Cryptographic tools could
be employed for fulfilling all these requirements.
Finally, it is necessary to have a secure storage for the
built evidence. Both features (cryptographic processing and
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secure storage), along with reliable timestamping, can be
performed by Hardware Security Modules (HSM) or Tamper
Proof Devices (TPD) [9].
To sum up, in this Section we have shown how nearby
vehicles and HSM devices can be employed to build digital
evidences. Nevertheless, a communication protocol between
the evidence requester and witnesses is still needed. EVIGEN
will be presented in the following Sections for this purpose.
III. MODEL
In this Section we will introduce the underlying model of
EVIGEN. For the sake of simplicity, this model has been
divided into three main blocks: network model, vehicular
model and threat model. The next sections present each one
separately.
A. Network model
The proposed protocol is expected to work on a typical road
environment. This is depicted on Figure 1. Although EVIGEN
will be more useful in dense networks, only two vehicles are
enough to run the protocol. With respect to communication
capabilities, each vehicle is assumed to be equipped with an
On-Board Unit (OBU). Although they will not be directly em-
ployed in our proposal, Road-Side Units (RSU) have been also
included in this model. They will be employed for performing
some auxiliary tasks, like Certificate Revocation Lists update.






Fig. 1. Expected EVIGEN road model
Note that a global communications infrastructure is not as-
sumed nor necessary for EVIGEN. This assumption makes the
protocol more suitable for vehicular environments. However,
it constraints some classical solutions in data security, such
as those based on online Trusted Third Parties (TTP) like
Certification or Timestamping Authorities. Nevertheless, we
assume that a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) exists, as it is
specified in the main information security standard on this area
(IEEE 1609.2, [4]).
B. Vehicular model
Every participant vehicle is assumed to be equipped with
a HSM-alike device. This will be useful for timestamping,
performing cryptographic operations and storing evidences.
With respect to their sensing capabilities, it is assumed that
they will have a set of sensor devices. They would range
from ultrasound sensors up to video cameras. However, it
is necessary for vehicles to link their perceptions to the
originating vehicle. This can be achieved by fusion of com-
munication measures and sensor perceptions. For example, if
the preceding vehicle is sensed to drive slower than the own
vehicle, and there is a message (e.g. beacon) received from a
vehicle in front claiming some identity, a link speed-identity
can be established. Although this is out of the scope of this
paper, fusion techniques are currently being developed for this
purpose with promising results [3].
With respect to identity management, every vehicle is as-
sumed to have a long-term identity (e.g. Electronic License
Plate). Moreover, for privacy preservation purposes, vehicles
can have a set of pseudonyms. Each pseudonym should be
related to a certified public/private key pair. To avoid tracking,
pseudonyms should be changed frequently (e.g. use of mix
contexts [10]). We propose using resolvable pseudonyms such
as those proposed in [11].
It is assumed that vehicles will share some traffic data
using VANET. These data interchanges can be performed
in an independent way, or in a collaborative paradigm. The
former can be achieved by periodically sending beacons,
each one containing information about the sender´s situation
and sensed environment. The latter has multiple shapes, such
as Cooperative Cruise Control (CCC). Under this paradigm,
vehicles are grouped because of their driving parameters (e.g.
destination, desired speed, etc.). In this way, a group member
has a great knowledge of the remaining members´ context.
This information sharing is interesting for the purpose of this
work, as they allow vehicles to know better which is the
behavior of their surrounding vehicles.
C. Threat model
Any vehicle (both requester and witnesses) can become
an attacker to EVIGEN. Nevertheless, we assume that in
every protocol execution, there will be a majority of honest
witnesses. On the other hand, we assume that attackers are
not colluding, that is, they operate independently and they
do not collaborate in their actions. Under this assumption,
attackers cannot claim the same false value. In this way,
dishonest (or faulty) testimonies will be easily identified and
isolated. Taking into account the main objective of their
attacks, different kinds of attacker can be identified:
● Protocol ineffectiveness. This attacker sends false infor-
mation when acting as a witness.
● Protocol inefficiency. This attacker does not take part in
the protocol, neither as a witness nor as an intermediary
vehicle (when needed).
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● Flooding. This attacker aims to overload the vehicular
communications channel. He sends continuously requests
for evidence generation.
● Eavesdropping. This attacker records all messages related
to EVIGEN. He aims to find confidential or private
information, such as the location of an entity.
Taking these attackers into account, the security analysis on
Section VI will show how EVIGEN is protected against them.
IV. WITNESS-BASED DIGITAL EVIDENCE GENERATION
PROTOCOL
Taking into account the discussion about digital evidences in
vehicular environments (Section II) and the underlying model
(Section III), in this Section the proposed protocol is described.
A protocol overview is firstly presented. Afterwards, the
notation in use is explained and finally the protocol steps are
described.
A. Overview
EVIGEN is intended to create digital evidences attesting
a vehicle´s behavior or situation in a given moment. This
evidence will be presented to an Authority (e.g. a judge)
in a dispute resolution process. As discussed above, nearby
vehicles can serve as an external and impartial source of
information. Thus, there are two different active roles in this
protocol: the vehicle which requests the evidence generation
(“requester”) and those vehicles which can give some data for
building it (“witnesses”).
The main goal of EVIGEN is to create an evidence based on
the received witnesses from adjacent vehicles. Considering the
high mobility of vehicles, the protocol must be as lightweight
as possible. For this purpose, EVIGEN consists of two
communication steps: request of information and testimony
collection. These steps are represented on Figure 2.


















Fig. 2. EVIGEN protocol steps.
In Figure 2, the requester is the blue vehicle (marked with
‘R’) while red cars (marked with ‘W’) are potential witnesses.
White vehicles are those which are near the requester, but are
not able to be witnesses. That could be the situation in which a
vehicle has recently arrived near to the requester, but does not
know any valuable data about the requester´s behavior in the
past. They are, however, indirectly useful for the purpose of
EVIGEN - they can serve as proxies between both requester
and witnesses. Note that new intermediaries can appear at any
moment, because of the own nature of vehicular movements.
Each witness will send its estimation about the requested
data. Sensor measurements experience some kind of uncer-
tainty, which have to be reflected in their testimonies. As evi-
dences are intended to be employed in courts, it is preferable
to build the description of the situation as simple as possible.
In this way, the authority will be able to understand easily the
circumstances in which some event happened. This implicit
requirement makes preferable to reach a consensus among
witnesses. Nevertheless, performing a consensus protocol (e.g.
[13]) among witnesses would not always reach a solution
within the required time. Thus, they are not suitable for this
context. For solving this, the requester in EVIGEN is allowed
to build the consensus based on the received testimonies.
Such consensus consists of the value set agreed by most
witnesses. Although there would be other ways of establishing
such consensus, we argue that it is the most intuitive one.
Along with their testimonies, witnesses send a special token
called Endorsement Token (ET). It contains the conditions
under which the requester is allowed to endorse such a value
(i.e. who is the requester and which information can be
endorsed on the witness´ behalf). In this way, the requester will
not be able to illegally build an evidence using information not
allowed by any of the endorsing witnesses.
B. Notation
The following notation will be in use for describing EVI-
GEN. First of all, existing roles will be noted as:
● R(t), Requester. It denotes its pseudonym on time t.
● Wi, Witness i. It denotes its pseudonym in use in each
protocol execution.
● AUT, the Authority to which the evidence will be sent.
Cryptographic fuctions (selected within those proposed in
IEEE 1609.2 [4]), will be marked as follows:
● H(M), hash function over the message ‘M’. It denotes the
message ‘M’ and its hash value.
● EK(M)/DK(M), asymmetric encryption/decryption over
‘M’ using key K through ECIES algorithm.
● SEK(M)/SDK(M), symmetric encryption/decryption over
‘M’ using key K through AES-CCM algorithm.
● SK (M), signature over ‘M’ using key K through ECDSA
algorithm. It denotes the message ‘M’ and its signature
value.
● Verify(S,Cert(X)), verification operation over signed mes-
sage ‘S’ using the key in Cert(X) public key certificate.
Finally, data at stake are noted as follows:
● Cert(X), public key certificate of entity (generally a
vehicle) X.
● interval(a,b), expression of all values contained in interval
[a,b], independently of the nature of a and b.
● contains(data,min,max), boolean function which deter-
mines if data ∈ interval(min,max).
● ti, time value of the moment i, built by the sender´s HSM.
● Loc(X), current location of entity (generally a vehicle) X.
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C. Protocol description
Following the description of EVIGEN is presented. Each of
the messages involved is explained, along with the computa-
tion needed to build them.
Phase 1. Request of information
In this message, the requester sends a signed message
specifying the required data. The time when this request is
sent will be noted as trq. On the other hand, the time the
required-data refers to, will be marked as tf . Recall that the
requester´s pseudonym could be different in both moments.
Thus, in this message the requester must show who it was at
time tf . This is done by digitally signing with both private
keys, as follows:
R(trq) → Wi : Cert(R(trq)),SKpriv(R(Trq))(Loc(R(trq)),trq,
Cert(R(tf )),SKpriv(R(Tf))(tf , required-data))
The required data depends on the target application of the
evidence, as introduced in Section II-B. The message is sent by
geocasting to all surrounding vehicles in a reasonable range.
In this way, channel overload is alleviated. Selected message
format is a signed WSM, as specified in IEEE 1609.2 for
inter-vehicular sporadic communications [4].
Phase 2. Testimony collection
In this second phase, witnesses send their estimations to
the requester. Although this phase requires some time to get
finished, for the sake of simplicity we will assume that it
is completely performed on the time of the response (t res).
This step only takes place if the previous request was valid.
Request validation applies not only to its signature, but also
to its location and time. In [14], mechanisms for such checks
are described. If it was a valid request, this phase is formed
by the following steps:
2.a. Data estimation based on external sources.
Each of the witnesses should build their own estimation
about the required data. They have probably received some
external data related to the requester. For example, previous
beacons or overheard Cooperative Cruise Control messages
could be seen as external sources of information. Using them,
a preliminary interval can be designed:
Wi : beaconing(R(tf)) x Coop. Cruise Control(R(tf )) ⇒
preliminary interval
2.b. Plausibility checks.
The composed interval can be analyzed by using the wit-
ness´ own knowledge. It is related to its own situation (po-
sition, speed, etc. at the requested moment) and the previous
measures obtained by its sensors (radar, video, etc.). Taken
such data into account, some values of the preliminary interval
can be discarded. For example, let´s consider a request referred
to the speed. Assume a preliminary interval of (100,120) mph.
If the witness was driving in tf at 110 mph. and sensors
indicate that the requester was overtaken, it would not be
possible for the requester to drive faster than 110 mph. Thus,
values from interval (110,120) would be discarded.
Wi : preliminary interval x sensors measurements⇒ inter-
val(min,max)
Processing tasks involved in this step are complex. Different
sources of information must be taken into account, along
with their uncertainty. Previous contributions have focused on
this area. Raya et al. proposed a framework to evaluate the
trustworthiness of data reported by other nodes [15]. Moreover,
Wex et al. review other proposals for trust establishment [16].
For the purpose of EVIGEN, any calculation method that
deals with these different sources could be used. Nevertheless,
efficiency considerations would be critical, as this operation
should be performed as fast as possible.
2.c. Data sending.
If the previous interval contains any value, the response can
be sent. This response is encrypted with the receiver´s public
key in the time of the requested data (tf ). It consists of three
parts:
● Testimony. It contains the witness´ estimation about the
required-data (i.e. interval(min,max)). This part is in-
tended to be read by the requester.
● Endorsement Token (ET). Once the responses from all
witnesses are collected, a common value for the requested
data is seeked among as much witnesses as possible.
Then, requester will use this token to reflect the witness´
endorsement to such value. As explained on the protocol
overview, this mechanism is intended to build a consensus
without requiring a heavy protocol.
ETWi = SEKet(Wi)(Wi,R(tf ), interval(min,max),tf,tres )
ET is, in fact, a ciphertext for the Authority. It contains
the endorsement conditions for that witness. The cipher-
ing key is sent inside the following Ticket.
● Ticket. It contains the key Ket(Wi)employed for ciphering
the ET introduced above. It is based on the classical
mechanism of digital enveloping:
Ticket(Wi,AUT) = EKpub(AUT )(Cert(Wi),
SKpriv(Wi)(Ket(Wi)))
Thanks to this data distribution, the witness´ identity is
hidden for the requester. This is particularly relevant for
those cases in which the testimony is not suitable for the
requester´s intentions. In those situations, the requester could
take reprisals against the witness.
The whole response is formed as follows. Note that the
testimony is sent to R(trq), that is, the requester pseudonym
when the first message (request) was sent:
Wi → R(trq): EKpub(R(Tf))(H(interval(min,max)),H(ETWi,
Ticket(Wi,AUT),Loc(Wi),tres))
Phase 3. Digital evidence generation.
The requester checks if the received spatial-temporal in-
formation is reasonable. He also verifies the integrity of the
received testimony. If so, he builds the consensus based on
the received responses. As introduced before, if no global
consensus exists, the most agreed value (data) will be chosen
instead. The whole digital evidence (Evid(R)) is built in time
tevid using this agreed value and the received ETs. For a
number n of witnesses, the resulting evidence would be formed
as:
Evid(R(tevid)) = Cert(R(tevid)), Evid info(R(tevid)), where
Evid info(R(tevid))= SKpriv(R(Tevid))(data, tf , tevid),
(Ticket(W1,AUT), ETW1, ..., Ticket(Wn,AUT), ETWn)
This evidence would be finally sent to the Authority:
R(tevid) → AUT: Evid(R(tevid))
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V. EVIDENCE VERIFICATION PROCESS
Once the evidence has been created by means of EVIGEN,
in this Section the corresponding verification process is pre-
sented. The notation in use is the same as presented in IV-B.
Except for Phase 1, all phases are executed for each of the
endorsing testimonies. Validation is only achieved if all checks
are passed.
Phase 1. Signature verification over Evid(R(tevid))
First of all, evidence signature is checked to guarantee
integrity and origin:
AUT : Verify(Evid info(R(tevid)),Cert(R(tevid)))
Phase 2. Ticket deciphering and endorsement restrictions
retrieval
The Ticket is deciphered to obtain Ket(Wi), which was used
to cipher the Endorsement Token:
AUT : DKpriv(AUT )(Ticket(Wi,AUT)), getting access to
(Cert(Wi), SKpriv(Wi)(Ket(Wi))).
The signature over Ket(Wi) is then verified. If successful,
symmetric decryption over ET is used to retrieve the endorse-
ment conditions:
AUT : SDKet(Wi)(ETWi), obtaining (Wi,R(tf ),
interval(min,max),tf ,tres)
Phase 3. Certificate status verification
Authority verifies if certificates of all involved entities were
valid (i.e. not revoked or expired) in the moment they were
used (tres for the witness, tevid for the requester)
Phase 4. Endorsement conditions verification
4.a Identity checks
The witness identity must be the same in both Ticket
and ET. Moreover, the requester must be the same as that
indicated in ET (although it can have changed its pseudonym).
Furthermore, the requester and the witness should be different
entities. Witnesses should also be all different entities. Finally,
the envisioned applications for the digital evidences require the
real identity of the requester to be obtained. For performing
all these checks, the receiving authority should contact with
the entity in charge of managing the pseudonyms.
4.b Legal consensus
Data inside the consensus must be allowed by all witnesses.
For this purpose, the function contains is employed. Thus, the
following expression must hold:
contains(data, mini, maxi) = true ∀ i
4.c Time checks
The time of the evidence data must be equal to that
contained in the endorsement conditions. Moreover, t evid must
be posterior (but not much) to tf .
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this Section, the security analysis of the proposal is
performed. The analysis is centered on verifying whether
the resulting evidence fulfills the admissibility requirements
described on Section II-A. The completeness requirement
depends on the requester (which has to ask for all necessary
data), so the remaining properties, which depend on the
security properties of EVIGEN, are analyzed. The first point
will deal with the authenticity of the evidence. In the second
point, the evidence reliability will be discussed. Thirdly,
privacy concerns are analyzed, because privacy is the most
prominent right potentially threatened in this context. Finally,
other threats will be studied.
A. Evidence authenticity
Evidence authenticity is related to assure that it has not been
altered, and that it has been built by some identifiable entities.
Moreover, the evidence holder should not be able to deny
having issued it. For this purpose, in this Section, entity au-
thentication, non-repudiation and data integrity are discussed.
Entity authentication matters are partially solved by public
key certificates imposed by IEEE 1609.2. However, PKI-based
techniques face some problems in decentralized environments
such as VANETs. For example, Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRL) are not easily distributable to all vehicles. This would
allow a vehicle to create evidences based on testimonies
whose witnesses use an expired certificate. In such situation,
EVIGEN would be useless. Some proposals have been made
to deal with this issues, such as the RCCRL protocol, in which
Compressed CRL updates are broadcasted by RSUs [17].
Non-repudiation in EVIGEN is assured for the requester of
the evidence. The final evidence is digitally signed, so origin
and authentication are assured. Non-repudiation of receipt
is not required in EVIGEN. Nevertheless, as the generated
evidence would be sent to an authority, it will be essential to
provide this service in that moment.
On the other hand, data integrity is assured in both kind of
messages. The request´s integrity is assured by verifying its
digital signature. With respect to testimonies, hash functions
assure this property.
B. Evidence reliability
Reliability of the evidence data is critical. The use of
witnesses (under the assumption of a honest majority) allows
EVIGEN to have a more reliable data source. Nevertheless,
EVIGEN has two problems (from the requester point of
view) which are not yet solved. On one hand, a dishonest
witness could offer the requester a different estimation from
that included on ETWi. In this way, the requester could
build an evidence which would not fit with such endorsement
conditions. On the other hand, different testimonies could be
received from the same witness under different pseudonyms.
The validation protocol would bring up this issue and would
make the evidence less credible.
Both problems are currently present. However, they are
assumed to have a limited impact. To put them in practice,
it would be necessary to alter the HSM, or to build a different
component. Moreover, performing this attack would need to
expend some computational power, and no direct benefits are
envisioned from it.
Finally, testimonies´ freshness are checked within the verifi-
cation process. By using HSM´s time source, it is not possible
to create a posteriori testimonies. Moreover, replay attacks are
also useless.
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C. Law compliance. Privacy preservation
From a conceptual point of view, the protocol looks for data
concerning the recent past behavior of a given vehicle. In other
words, surrounding vehicles can establish a link between an
identifier (i.e. pseudonym) and its circumstances, and they are
able to store that information for a period of time. Moreover,
the requester reveals its pseudonym in the past, so traceability
is a need in EVIGEN. Indeed, EVIGEN proposes a tradeoff
between a privacy loss (traceability) and a benefit (getting a
reliable digital evidence). Note that EVIGEN only implies a
limited traceability - only nearby vehicles will be able to link
two pseudonyms.
Testimonies, on the other hand, are ciphered with the
receiver´s public key, so there is no chance of obtaining any
information. Intermediary vehicles cannot obtain any private
information from testimonies either. With respect to witnesses´
privacy, witnesses´ identity remain hidden for the requester.
Furthermore, the witness´ real identity is not revealed in the
verification process.
D. Other threats
Availability of the communication capabilities could be
compromised if EVIGEN were employed frequently. In fact,
every step involves cryptographic operations, so it would
be possible (at first) to perform a Denial of Service (DoS)
attack by flooding of requests (Phase 1). This kind of attack
would be especially useful when the evidence is requested
for accident reconstruction. In that situation, at least two
different vehicles would be affected, so there would be a real
interest in avoiding EVIGEN successful execution. This threat
is partially alleviated by EVIGEN design - it involves only two
communication phases. Moreover, cryptographic functions in
use are expected to be efficient. However, this threat should be
analyzed in a real environment, where different applications
would be running at the same time.
On the other hand, reusing the key Ket could be not advis-
able. That key is employed to cipher the valid endorsement
conditions. If it is employed in many messages to the same
vehicle, a clear text attack could be performed by the requester.
This threat is unlikely to happen, but can be easily avoided -
it is enough to change the key in each message (or, at least,
with a reasonable frequency).
Witnesses offering false data will not affect the protocol
execution if there is a majority of honest witnesses and
dishonest ones are not colluding. This honest majority has
been assumed for dense networks, but could not be fulfilled
in sparse ones. In any case, the main deterrent should be the
legal consequences of such false informations. However, such
legal measures are out of the scope of this paper.
Uncollaborative nodes could also be present. It will be
always possible for any vehicle to switch off their com-
munication device. This would lead to less witnesses and
could make EVIGEN useless. Intermediary vehicles could
also avoid relaying messages. To prevent all these undesired
behaviors, rewarding protocols for enforcing cooperation could
be applied. Previous proposals explained in Buttya´n et al.
could be taken as a basis [12]. The concrete adaptation of
such mechanisms is left to future work.
Finally, the use of pseudonyms should not allow to execute
Sybil attacks. Nevertheless, as pseudonyms are managed by
the HSM, it is not possible for a vehicle to use more than
one pseudonym at a time, except if the HSM had been
compromised.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
The current description of EVIGEN has shown its validity
from a theoretical point of view. Nevertheless, some practical
issues should be addressed before putting it on a real envi-
ronment. First of all, EVIGEN requires the vehicles to store
enough sensor measurements and received data. The storage
requirements will be directly influenced by the gap between
the time of the event (tf ) and that of the request (treq). Indeed,
this gap will be different for each envisioned application. For
spatial-temporal attestation, there is no practical upper limit
for this gap - a requester would ask the witnesses for its
location at a very past moment. Nevertheless, the witnesses´
mobility will bring EVIGEN useless if the required moment
is far from the request. The probability of keeping a witness
near the requester for a long time diminishes (in theory) with
time. Thus, for this application, a reasonable upper limit for
the time gap should be established. The second application
was to attest the requester adequate behavior in the past. An
example is to proof a legal speed when a speeding fine has
been notified. In that case, the time gap would be related to
the amount of time required to receive the notification of such
fine. The last application was obtaining proofs related to an
accident. In this case, the time gap is assumed to be short
- the request would be sent whenever the accident happens.
However, the high difference perceived for each application
should be taken into account. A single maximum time gap
should be established for all applications.
On the other hand, synchronization is also relevant in this
context. Timestamps are assumed to be on both requests and
testimonies. HSMs are often assumed to have a reliable time
source. However, a secure synchronization method between
HSMs would be required. This issue is out of the scope
of EVIGEN, but it should be addressed before putting the
protocol on practice.
Last but not least, channel overload prevention should be
incoporated into EVIGEN. Consider this situation: Once a
speeding fine has been received, the affected vehicle asks wit-
nesses for its speed. Once the testimonies have been collected,
no valuable consensus is reached (i.e. the most agreed speed
value is not useful for the requester´s purposes). In the current
version of EVIGEN, it would be possible to repeatedly send
requests until a better result is reached. This action would
affect negatively the VANET availability, so some mechanism
should be added to avoid this situation.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The security of vehicular communications has been exten-
sively explored so far [18]. Nevertheless, to the best of our
knowledge there are little contributions on evidence generation
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in vehicular environments. The most representative contribu-
tions are related to accident reconstruction. In [19], HSMs
are employed to register all the events produced by the own
car. Once the crash has happened, involved vehicles send some
beacons to inform the other vehicles. HSM of crashed vehicles
is then employed as a black box. However, such informations
are based on the own vehicle´s sensor measurements, which
could be tampered with. Generated evidences validity could
be called into question.
On the other hand, [20] performs accident reconstruction
by using the own data and the received communications.
Nevertheless, data security requirements are not covered in
that work. Moreover, they do not provide mechanisms to build
a digital evidence.
Evidence generation is also present in the security frame-
work presented by Lin et al. [21]. Their focus is on providing
security, privacy and efficient traceability. They base their ap-
proach in using ID-based cryptography and group signatures.
Although the former could be applied directly to our proposal,
we have chosen a certificate based solution to be in agreement
with IEEE standard.
Finally, group communications could be envisioned as a
means to select witnesses. Group formation has been previ-
ously studied by Raya et al. [22]. Nevertheless, the requester
in EVIGEN is requiring information of a moment in the past.
Given the volatility of the group formation, it could be possible
that current group members were not present at the requested
time. For this reason, we argue that this choice would not
always be suitable.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we have presented EVIGEN, a protocol for
creating evidences about a vehicle´s recent behavior. Data
employed for creating such evidence is obtained from the
neighboring vehicles, which act as witnesses. In this way,
forged sensor measurements from the own vehicle could
be used to build the evidence, but no supporting witnesses
would be found. EVIGEN allows collecting all testimonies
from witnesses, building a unified description of the situation
in the required moment. Although each witness sends its
particular estimation of the requested value, they also send an
authorization token which allows the requester to endorse the
agreed value on the witness´ behalf. Moreover, the protocol is
executed in two steps, which makes it interesting to be applied
in such decentralized and changing environment.
The corresponding verification process has also been de-
scribed. The security analysis has shown that the requirements
for evidence generation are accomplished to a reasonable
level. Data obtained from witnesses is adequately protected.
However, some security drawbacks have been detected. These
problems are related with the witnesses´ dishonest behavior.
Future research work will be centered, in the short term,
on solving the detected security problems. Moreover, a
simulation-based analysis must be conducted for a practical
efficiency evaluation. On the other hand, it would be interest-
ing to incorporate aggregation techniques in EVIGEN. In this
way, a witness could offer an aggregated testimony, improving
the overall efficiency. However, a detailed analysis is needed
in order to address such issue while preserving the security of
the information at stake. Finally, a micropayment mechanism
will be added to EVIGEN. In this way, witnesses would get
a benefit from offering their testimony. Furthermore, only
vehicles with enough credit would be allowed to request. Its
benefits would be two-fold: it would avoid the requester to
overload the channel with requests, and it would encourage
witnesses to take part in the protocol.
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